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DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN REVERSE
DIRECT ACTIONS: SECTION 1332(c) AND THE
NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION
INTRODUCTION
If any topic in procedural law' is incendiary in the debate
it sparks, the issue of federal diversity jurisdiction is explosive.'
The controversy has been fueled further by a split between the
Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal on the scope of federal
diversity power3 limitations imposed by the 1964 amendment
to section 1332, the diversity statute.' The amendment elimi-
Although categorization of legal aspects as "substantive" or "procedural" is
sometimes inadequate or conceptually difficult, such problems do not arise here.
"PROCEDURAL LAW. That which prescribes method of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion; machinery for carrying on a suit." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1367 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
2 The arguments concerning diversity jurisdiction are limitless. Those favoring the
continuance of such power have developed entirely new justifications for it. "Today
the traditional local prejudice basis for diversity is but one, and not the only, nor even
the principal, reason for permitting the exercise of diversity jurisdicton." Weckstein,
Citizenship for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction, 26 Sw. L.J. 360, 361 (1972)
[hereinafter referred to as Weckstein]. Those who would abolish diversity as a basis
for federal power are also finding new reasons for doing so. Problems in ascertaining
and applying state law correctly are said to "roil the placid assumptions underlying
arguments to continue diversity jurisdiction." Hertz, Misreading the Erie Signs: The
Downfall of Diversity, 61 Ky. L.J. 861, 862 (1973).
In one scholar's thinking, the attitudes toward diversity held by federal judges are
in such conflict that decisions concerning elimination, retention or modification of
such power should be made within each separate federal judicial district, rather than
on a nationwide basis. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a
Proposal, 91 HARv. L. REv. 317, 339-40 (1977). See also, e.g., Frank, Let's Keep Diver-
sity Jurisdiction, 9 FoRuM 157 (1973); Hunter, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: The
Unnecessary Precaution, 46 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 347 (1978). "There can be little doubt,
however, that diversity jurisdiction will continue to engender controversy for the near
future." Weckstein, supra note 2, at 382.
2 For a discussion of the history and the scope of diversity power in general, see
C. VRiGrHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS ch. 4 (3rd ed. 1976).
Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439, § 1, 78 Stat. 445 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) (1976)) added the following to the diversity statute:
Provided further, That in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or
contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer
shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as
well as of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business.
Id. (latter emphasis added).
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nates federal subject-matter jurisdiction in many suits between
injured parties and liability insurers by including the state in
which the insured is a citizen as a state of citizenship of the
insurer.5 The circuits agree that the proviso applies to "direct
actions," wherein the injured party is plaintiff,' but they disa-
gree on the question of whether it applies to "reverse direct
actions" initiated by the insurer.7
In Campbell v. Insurance Co. of North America," the Fifth
Circuit held that an action instituted by an insurer to deter-
mine liability to the injured defendant was governed by the
1964 amendment and affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the action. On similar facts, the Sixth Circuit held in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Insurance Co. v. Greene' that the amend-
ment applies only to actions against a liability insurer, and
reversed the federal district court's dismissal of a declaratory
judgment action brought by the liability insurer."
The effect of the Sixth Circuit's holding is to permit an
insurer who anticipates an imminent lawsuit and wins the race
to the courthouse to choose between a state and a federal
forum, while denying the same choice to an injured plaintiff.
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation acts to bar reverse direct
actions if they would be barred when brought by the injured
party. Both circuits obviously cannot be correct. This com-
ment will analyze the legislative history of the 1964 amend-
ment to section 1332, discuss the policies for favoring one mode
of statutory interpretation over the other and suggest that Con-
' A corporate insurer will retain its citizenship otherwise imposed on corporations,
thereby giving it three states of citizenship in some situations. Thus if an insured
citizen of Kentucky injures a co-citizen the availability of an action directly against
the tortfeasor's insurer, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
New York, will not create diversity jurisdiction for access to federal court, because the
insurer also assumes Kentucky citizenship.
I This is the typical alignment which would result under a direct action statute.
In states without such statutes, the same limitation would apply to suits brought in
federal court against both the insured and the insurer, but in which the insured is
dropped from the action. O.M. Greene Livestock Co. v. Azalea Meats, Inc., 516 F.2d
509 (5th Cir. 1975).
1 For the purposes of this comment, a "reverse direct action" is defined as a
declaratory judgment brought by the insurer against the injured party for a determina-
tion of the liability of the insured, who has not been joined in the action.
8 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977).
9 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979).
,o Id. at 128.
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gress clarify the statutory language in order to accomplish the
goal of the proviso: the conservation of federal judicial energy.
I. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE 1964 AMENDMENT
The legislative history of the 1964 amendment to section
1332 reveals that the major purpose of abolishing diversity ju-
risdiction in most" direct action cases was to lighten the case-
load per judgeship in the Eastern District of Louisiana,'" which
was "150 percent greater than the national average .... "I'
Although both Wisconsin and Louisiana had statutes permit-
ting direct actions against insurers without joinder of the in-
sured,' 4 the crowded docket problem existed only in Louis-
iana.'5 Thus it is not readily apparent that the Louisiana direct
action statute was the major cause of the clogged courts; "the
most significant factors contributing to the overloading of this
Louisiana federal court would appear to be the peculiar Louis-
iana law under which the reviewing court is not bound, as are
the federal courts, by a jury's findings of fact,"'" and the large
number of admiralty claims due to New Orleans' status as the
nation's second largest port. 7
The mere existence of the option to litigate in federal court
rather than maintain the same direct action in a state forum
scarcely explains a local plaintiff's preference for the federal
system. Theoretically, a federal forum would offer a benefit to
" Diversity will continue to exist when both the insured and the insurer are of
diverse citizenship from the injured party in the pre-1964 meaning of diversity.
,2 S. REP. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2778 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
,1 Id. at 2780. In 1971, seven years after the enactment of the 1964 amendment,
the caseload in the Eastern District of Louisiana was 372 per judgeship, compared to
the national average of 307 per judgeship. Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 398, 401 (1972).
' Prior to the advent of direct action statutes, the insured was generally held to
be an indispensable party to suits involving an adjudication of liability. 20 J. APPLE-
MAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11371, at 168-69 (1963).
11 "The record indicates that in the State of Wisconsin the filing of suits under
the direct action statute of that State has not imposed any undue burden on the
Federal district courts therein." SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2779.
1" Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action
Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. Rav. 268, 273. Professor Weckstein
critically questions the legislative wisdom of a large-scale solution to such a small-scale
problem.
'7 "This maritime growth has flooded the local district court with admiralty ac-
tions." SENATE REPORT, supra note 12. at 2781 (emphasis added).
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the "foreign" defendant,"8 thus decreasing its allure for the
local plaintiff. In addition, any higher incidence of removal" to
federal court than existed in Wisconsin must also be explained
by Louisiana's appellate procedure. Therefore, although the
problem sought to be remedied was not caused soley by the
direct action statutes, Congress determined that the virtual
abolition of federal power to hear suits brought under those
statutes was the solution.
The purpose of this comment is not to criticize the policy
considerations which prompted the 1964 amendment but to
assess the decisions construing the proviso in light of those
considerations. Any interpretation of the diversity statute re-
quires recognition of the congressional intent to free federal
courts of cases concerning the liability of an insured to a co-
citizen.20
II. APPLICATION AND SCOPE OF THE PROVISION
Although the legislative history of the 1964 amendment
indicates that it was intended to bar direct actions "on certain
tort claims in which both parties are local residents,"'" the
provision applies to some non-tort suits with equal force, most
notably to workers' compensation actions,22 but the effects of
11 "The theory upon which jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the United
States, in controversies between citizens of different States, has its foundation in the
supposition that, possibly, the state tribunal might not be impartial between their own
citizens and foreigners." Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855).
11 Removal has, in the past at least, accounted for only a small fraction of the cases
in federal court. "In the year ended June 30, 1960, 3700 actions were removed from
state court to federal court, as against 55,584 civil actions commenced in federal
court." C. WiuoHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 149 n.6 (3rd ed. 1976).
20 "The committee believes that [such cases] do not come within the spirit or the
intent of the basic purpose of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal judicial system."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2784. See also the letter from the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to the Chairman of the House Committee on
the Judiciary located in SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2784:
Direct action statutes existing in Louisiana, Wisconsin, and possibly
other States, have operated to bring into the district courts under the diver-
sity jurisdiction a large number of tort cases involving only local residents,
which in other States would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State
courts. While within the letter of the diversity jurisdiction, it appears that
"these direct action cases" are not within its spirit or intent.
Id.
21 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2778.
22 See Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 398, 407 (1972).
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the amendment are not applicable to all actions involving an
insurer wherein the insured is not a party. Suits to determine
coverage or to compel performance on the insurance contract
which do not involve an adjudication of the liability of the
insureds are not the type of suits intended to be governed by
the proviso.24 Action by an insured against the insurer for recov-
ery under an uninsured motorist clause is not a direct action
as contemplated by Congress and is unaffected by the amend-
ment.2 A declaratory judgment which does not concern the
issue of liability but only the question of coverage is not a direct
action, 8 nor is a suit to enforce the policy once the insured's
liability has already been litigated, whether prosecuted by the
insureds or by the injured party.
28
The first action instituted by an insurer rather than
against one in which the 1964 amendment was asserted to de-
stroy diversity was Government Employees Insurance Co. v.
LeBleu.2 1 The district court held that the provision did not
apply because of the nature of the question before the court,
not because the suit was initiated by the insurer:
" Fiorentino v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (suit
to compel performance on policy).
24 "Unless the suit . . . is of such a nature that liability sought to be imposed
could be imposed against the insured, this action is not a 'direct action' in the sense
used in the proviso of § 1332(c)." Lank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 349, 351 (D. Del.
1970). Although this is a good statement of the general rule, some actions in which the
insured could not have been held liable have been held to be governed by the proviso.
In Ferrara v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 436 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Ark. 1977), the district court
dismissed a suit against an insurer because the plaintiff and the insured were co-
citizens, despite the insured's statutory immunity from liability because of its status
as a charitable organization. The same result was reached in Hernandez v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1974), wherein a Texas law immunized employers from
workers' compensation liability and required suits only against the insurer. The techni-
cal immunity imposed by such statutes should not change the result which Congress
sought.
E.g., Inman v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
2 White v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 356 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1966).
Carvin v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 253 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (suit
by insured tortfeasor for use of injured judgment creditor).
" Cunningham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Tenn.
1969). See also Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co., 369 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1966) (alterna-
tive holding) (Section 1332(c) did not bar the action because the insured's liability was
not in issue and in any event the cause of action arose prior to the effective date of
the amendment).
29 272 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. La. 1967).
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It should be particularly noted that the insurer here has sued
only for a declaration of non-coverage. Had the insurer in this
suit also raised the issue of the liability of the insured against
the injured parties, we might be inclined to accept mover's
argument, considering this suit in reality a "direct action
against the insurer" and dismissing for lack of diversity under
§ 1332(c). But a declaratory suit seeking simply a declaration
of non-coverage under the policy, whether brought by the
insurer, by the insured, or even by an injured party, is simply
not a direct action .... 30
It was not until ten years later that a federal court actually
faced the problem of the reverse direct action hypothesized in
LeBleu.
III. REVERSE DIRECT ACTIONS
A. Fifth Circuit Approach: Campbell v. Insurance Co. of
North America
3'
Campbell v. Insurance Co. of North America entered the
federal court system as a trial de novo of a workers' compensa-
tion award given by the Texas Industrial Accident Board.2 The
district court dismissed the action initiated by the insurer,
citing Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance Co., 33 a case which
barred a similar suit brought by the injured worker. In both
cases, the worker and employer were citizens of Texas. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the Campbell dismissal, holding that the
action was just as direct as if it were instituted by the claimant,
and that "the overall proceeding seen as a whole, is that of a
process initiated by the injured workman against the insurer
... ."34 The insurer sought a redetermination of the liability
which had been found by the Board, thereby bringing the case
within the definition of direct actions as it had been consis-
tently applied.
35
11 Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
M 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977).
3 While labeled an appeal of the award, the action involved relitigating the fact
of liability as well as damages.
33 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1974).
31 552 F.2d at 605.
31 See note 24 supra for a discusson of the criteria to be considered in determining
whether a suit is a direct action.
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In affirming the dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction,
the court specifically addressed the prospect of affording differ-
ent treatment to the insurer who won the race to the courthouse
than that available to an injured plaintiff, and concluded that
"to accept appellant's contention would be [to] construe the
statute so as to provide jurisdiction in federal court for a dissat-
isfied insurer-since the appeal action is not against it-but
none for the unhappy claimant. Such a result argues eloquently
against the appellant's contention." 36 The result in Campbell
fulfilled the LeBleu prophesy that the reverse direct action in
which the insurer attempts to invoke diversity jurisdiction will
be governed by the limitation applicable to suits brought by an
injured party seeking to litigate the issue of the liability of a
co-citizen.37
B. Sixth Circuit Analysis: Aetna Casualty & Surety Insur-
ance Co. v. Greene 8
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co. v. Greene, an
insurer brought a declaratory judgment action against an in-
jured employee for a determination of liability under a workers'
compensation arrangement in Tennessee. The insured em-
ployer and the defendant were Tennessee citizens. The
plaintiff-insurer was incorporated in Connecticut and also had
its principal place of business there.3
The district court granted the defendant's dismissal mo-
tion on the basis of Campbell"0 and the insurer appealed. The
Sixth Circuit reversed and held that diversity existed, but
admitted that diversity would not exist had the injured party
initiated the litigation.4' The court attempted to distinguish
' 552 F.2d at 605.
' See text accompanying note 30 supra which indicates that the alignment of the
parties should not control this question.
606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979).
' Id. at 125.
40 552 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1977).
1, The court relied on the wording of the proviso:
Assuming, for the sake of discusson, that defendant had initiated an action
in the district court against Aetna for Workers' Compensation, the provisions
of § 1332(c) would now be applicable . . . .However, in the present case,
the insurer Aetna is the moving party, and there is technically no action,
direct or otherwise, against a liability insurer.
606 F.2d at 127 (emphasis added).
1979-801
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between the policy justifications for denying federal jurisdic-
tion to an insurer who is an involuntary litigant and those
applicable when the insurer brings the suit:
If, pursuant to § 1332(c), a liability insurer is denied access
to the federal courts, the insurer is thereby forced to com-
mence its action in a foreign jurisdiction, namely the local
jurisdiction of the injured party. In this forum, the out-of-
state insurer may, at least in theory, be subject to local preju-
dice in favor of the injured resident."
The reasoning behind the court's distinction is elusive.
The court noted that because of this theoretical possibility of
prejudice in state court in favor of the injured resident "direct
actions brought by liability insurers . . .lie squarely within
'the spirit and the intent. . . of the diversity jurisdiction of the
Federal judicial system.' 4 3 The problem in the court's distinc-
tion is that, regardless of whether the out-of-state insurer is an
involuntary litigant or a plaintiff, the theoretical prejudice will
be operative in favor of the injured local citizen; the particular
alignment of the parties is immaterial to this prejudice consid-
eration. Indeed, the out-of-state insurer in the posture of the
involuntary litigant needs the protection afforded by "the
spirit and intent. . . of the diversity jurisdicton of the Federal
judicial system" just as much, if not more than, the out-of-
state insurer in the offensive posture. Because the court's justi-
fication for its interpretation of section 1332(c) rests on this




" While the Sixth Circuit cited to 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE 9 0.71 (2d ed.
1979) in support of its distinction between the insurer as an involuntary litigant and
the insurer as a plaintiff, see 606 F.2d at 127, there is no reference to such a distinction
in that analysis. As to the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, Moore notes, without
reference to the alignment of the parties, that: "It is the generally accepted view that
diversity jurisdiction was established to provide access to a competent and impartial
tribunal, free from local prejudice or influence, for the determination of controversies
between citizens of different states." 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRArCE $ 0.71 [3.-] (2d
ed. 1979). Moore also notes, again without reference to the alignment of the parties,
that, "[wihile local prejudices and state jealousies may be diminishing, it is a fair
inference that some litigants still resort to the federal courts because of apprehensions
as to the kind of justice which they will receive in the courts of the state of which their
adversary is a citizen." Id. at 0.71 [3.-2].
[Vol. 68
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IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
This examination of the soundness of the two reverse di-
rect action decisions will apply the policy articulated by Con-
gress by its enactment of the 1964 amendment, the tests uti-
lized in previous decisions for determining whether a suit is a
direct action, the principles established for interpreting the
diversity statute, and fundamentals of fairness.
A. Congressional Policy Behind the 1964 Amendment: The
Elimination of Diversity Jurisdiction in Cases Involving the
Determination of Liability of Co-Citizens
When Congress passed the diversity-limiting provision, it
determined that a federal interest existed in freeing court dock-
ets from cases concerned with establishing the liability of co-
citizens. 5 It also abandoned any interest in affording liability
insurers access to a federal forum by denying removal in the
typical case instituted by the injured party. At issue is whether
Congress intended to predicate the abolition of specific cases
on the nomenclature of the parties or on the subject of the
cases.
It should be emphasized, however, that the position of this comment is that by
the 1964 amendment to § 1332 Congress evinced an intention to abandon its interest
in protecting the out-of-state insurer from "local prejudice or influence" in direct
action law suits, inasmuch as those cases involve a determination of the liability of an
insured to a co-citizen and thus fall outside the "spirit and intent" of diversity jurisdic-
tion. The contention is that the logic behind congressional intent to withdraw the
protection afforded by diversity jurisdiction in direct action cases is equally applicable
to reverse direct action cases since both involve a determination of the liability of an
insured to a co-citizen. See notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of this contention.
11 The problem was brought to the attention of Congress by direct action statutes
which allowed insurers to be sued without joinder of the co-citizen who would pre-
viously have been a necessary party-defendant, and thereby created diversity artifi-
cially. "While within the letter of the diversity jurisdiction, it appears that these direct
action cases are not within its spirit or intent." SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2784.
While not specifically mentioning the reverse direct action situation, such cases have
the identical potential for violating the purpose of diversity since "all the persons
involved in the accident are residents of [the same state]." Id. at 2781. Congress thus
focused on the fact that the crux of the problem was that the issue to be resolved was
the liability of one co-citizen to another, and sought to abolish diversity in such cases.
Although the language ultimately adopted refers to suits "against" insurers, there is
no indication that Congress intended a different result in reverse direct actions. This
author contends that Congress overlooked the possibility of reverse direct actions.
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There is no plausible reason for federal interests to differ
because of the alignment of the parties. Regardless of which
party is labeled as the plaintiff, the issue for resolution is the
same: the liability of an insured to a co-citizen. Such actions
"do not come within the spirit or the intent of the basic purpose
of the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal judicial system."4
The Sixth Circuit's attempt to distinguish actions brought by
insurers on the basis of the risk of prejudice overlooks the fact
that Congress has dealt with that issue. The legislative history
of the amendment demonstrates that protecting a liability in-
surer from prejudice is no longer a federal concern.47
B. The Determination of Whether a Suit is a Direct Action
Prior to Aetna,4 the delineation between suits which were
judicially defined as direct actions and those which were not
was based on the nature of the question before the court, not
on the nomenclature of the parties.49 Suits to adjudicate the
liability of an insured to a citizen of the same state were within
the 1964 amendment, whether styled as declaratory judgments
or not. 0 Actions which did not address the issue of liability
were outside of the provision, even if brought by an injured
party seeking recovery against a liability insurer without join-
der of the insured.5' This delineation comports with the con-
gressional intent to apply the provision to cases in which the
liability of an insured to a co-citizen is at issue.
C. Principles Governing the Interpretation of the Diversity
Statute
The court in Aetna was especially concerned that the lan
guage of the 1964 amendment did not specifically mention that
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2784.
'7 See note 45 supra for a discussion of congressional intent as inferred from the
applicable legislative history.
43 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979).
49 See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 398 (1972).
50 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. LeBleu, 272 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. La. 1967)
(dicta).
5, Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 313 F. Supp. 367 (D. Conn. 1970);
Cunningham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (action
on contract after previous adjudication of insured's liability).
[Vol. 68
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it applied to actions initiated by insurers.5 2 While it is a famil-
iar maxim that the jurisdictional statutes are to be strictly
construed,53 the principle from which the phrase is derived can-
not be served by strict construction in reverse direct actions.
That principle is to limit federal jurisdiction by the interpreta-
tion rather than to enlarge it, " in deference to state sover-
eignty,5 and "in order to keep [federal courts] free for their
distinctive federal business." 56 A broad construction of the 1964
amendment is necessary to limit federal jurisdiction in an area
which Congress has determined is not federal business.57
D. A Fairness Analysis
In Campbell," the Fifth Circuit noted that refusing to
apply the limiting provision to actions brought by insurers
would give insurers a choice of forums while affording no such
choice to injured parties." Such unequal treatment does not
further the goals of the amendment; 0 the classification of in-
jured persons as the exclusive group to which the law acts as a
bar is irrelevant to the objective of the law.
The unfairness of the result in the Sixth Circuit's position
in Aetna," the court's deviation from the formula established
for determining application of the provision,62 the court's will-
ingness to expand rather than restrict federal jurisdiction,"
and the court's adherence to a policy which Congress had
52 606 F.2d at 127-28. "No court is allowed to supplement a clear statutory provi-
sion such as § 1332(c), even when such supplement would produce beneficial results.
To do so would exceed the court's power of statutory interpretation . . . ." Id.
11 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978).
' Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
Id.
0 Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941).
'T "This Court has given [§ 1332(c)] the broad interpretation it deserves in light
of the harm Congress sought to remedy." O.M. Greene Livestock Co. v. Azalea Meats,
Inc., 516 F.2d 509, 510 (5th Cir. 1975).
s' 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 605.
' See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of
the amendment.
' See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
e' See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
" See notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
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abandoned64 all indicate that the decision is lacking in sound
foundation.
CONCLUSION
Although analysis indicates that the Fifth Circuit made
the correct decision in Campbell, the split between the circuits
is just as damaging to the federal judiciary regardless of which
decision was correct. Before more federal judicial energy is
wasted resolving this clash, there should be enough legislative
energy expended to remove the statutory language which mis-
directed the Sixth Circuit. Appropriate language would delete
the reference to suits "against" insurers and substitute a provi-
sion that the Act applies to suits between insurers and injured
parties wherein the insured's liability is at issue. 5 Such a revi-
sion would clarify the original intent of Congress, comport with
the judicial definition of direct actions, provide for a logical
narrowing of jurisdiction in cases involving identical issues and
parties, and afford equal treatment to individuals and insurers.
While federal diversity jurisdiction is likely to remain an in-
flammatory subject even after this particular problem is re-
solved, a resolution of this issue will serve well by reducing the
amount of fuel which feeds the controversy.
Roy D. Wasson
E, See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
'5 This author proposes the following:
Provided further, that in any action involving a liability insurer, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, in which the liability of an insured to an-
other party is at issue, and to which the insured is not a party, such insurer
shall be deemed a citizen of the state in which the insured is a citizen, as
well as of any state by which the insured has been incorporated and of the
state in which it has its principal place of business. This provision also
applies to actions wherein the insured is afforded legal immunity from liabil-
ity, but the action arises out of a loss for which the insurer has agreed to
provide coverage and for which the insured would otherwise be legally liable.
[Vol. 68
